I. INTRODUCTION
Expansion of the commercial gambling industry in the United States during the 1990s and 2000s has provided a new source of tax revenue for states that have authorized casino gambling. Currently, twenty-two states allow commercial casino operations, defined as landbased, riverboat, dockside, and racetrack casinos but not including tribal casinos. 1 The scope of the gambling industry in the commercial casino states and the tax revenue infusion from casino gambling has been significant. During 2011, 492 casinos operated in the commercial casino states, generating $35.6 billion in adjusted gross receipts (AGR) from gambling, and paying $7.9 billion in direct casino taxes from their AGR to state governments. 2 AGR is the "wagering handle" (the total amount wagered by gamblers) minus the "payout" (the amount of winnings paid out to gamblers). 3 Indeed, revenue production from casino taxes has been an important factor, if not the most important factor, considered by state policy makers when legalizing casino gambling. Concentrated markets in states with a restricted number of licenses can result in rents for the owners of the licenses, which governments may view as an easy source of additional state revenue.
The states that allow commercial casinos to operate also impose specific taxes and special regulations on the casino operators. 4 Casinos incur these taxes in addition to the prevailing normal sales, income, and real estate taxes imposed by state and local government. As with other state taxes, casino taxes vary substantially among states both in terms of structure and tax burden. Each of the commercial casino states levies a tax on the AGR generated by a casino.
The AGR taxes, commonly referred to as wagering taxes, are imposed as a percentage of AGR under both flat rate and graduated rate structures. No matter the structure, the wagering taxes are the dominant revenue producers among state casino taxes. In addition to wagering taxes, several states (all in the Midwest) impose admission taxes equal to a fixed dollar amount per person entering the casino. Like the wagering taxes, admission taxes are also imposed under flat rate and graduated rate structures. Still other states impose machine taxes, which are per-unit taxes on slot machines. As shown in Table 1 , the revenue yield in 2011 from direct casino taxes averaged roughly $0.36 billion per state in states that have regulated commercial casino gambling. The average yield from gambling taxes is equivalent to the average yield from tobacco taxes and about 45 percent of the average yield from motor fuels taxes in states with casino taxes.
[ Table 1 about here]
The levels of casino AGR and the casino direct tax burdens vary widely among commercial casino states, as shown in Table 2 . States like Nevada, Mississippi, and New Jersey promote tourism, gambling volume, and employment in the casino sector with relatively low rates of taxation. Gambling in these states is typically associated with destination resort casinos, where hotels, restaurants, and entertainment are found in multiple casinos at a single location, attracting multiple-day visits from tourists. Nevada's casino industry generated the highest casino AGR in 2011, yet was subject to the lowest average tax rate of 8.09 percent. Not coincidentally, Nevada does not restrict the number of casino licenses as do most other states.
Other states impose higher wagering tax rates, and many have revised their casino tax schedule upward over time. As of 2011, among the eleven states with highest casino AGR, Pennsylvania and New York have the highest average wagering tax rates (48 and 47 percent respectively),
followed by Illinois at 33 percent. Considering many states have graduated schedules, the variation in marginal wagering tax rates is even more striking.
[ Table 2 
II. LITERATURE
Research estimating the determinants of gambling comprises literature on lottery games, pari-mutuel horse racing, and casino gambling. A robust literature on lotteries and pari-mutuel horse racing has developed over 30-plus years. 5 Within this literature, several studies suggest that the win percentage of lotteries (percent of lottery sales retained by the government) and the win percentage of pari-mutuel horse racing tracks (percent of wagering handle retained by the 5 Grote and Matheson (2011) give a comprehensive summary of the lottery literature.
tracks) is a significant determinant of the amount wagered on lottery games and horse races and by extension the revenue generated by these operations. 6 In other words, price matters.
A modest body of casino research has analyzed various price and non-price determinants of casino wagering handle and casino AGR. In terms of non-price determinants, Cargill and Eadington (1978) find significant seasonal variation in AGR at Nevada casinos, particularly in the Reno-Sparks and Lake Tahoe markets. Several studies have examined the effects of regulation on casino gambling, including Nichols (1998a Nichols ( , 1998b , Ali (2003), and Landers (2008) . Taken together, these studies find that lifting or reducing boarding/cruising restrictions, wagering loss limits, and restrictions on gaming space have a positive impact on gambling activity. In contrast to a general trend toward deregulation, casino smoking bans have recently been imposed. Studies by Pakko (2006 Pakko ( , 2008 and Thalheimer and Ali (2008) Navin and Sullivan (2007) find that entry of new casinos in the St.
Louis, Missouri market increased the payout rate to gamblers of slot machines.
One of the shortcomings of this literature on casino gambling is the paucity of estimates of the price elasticity of demand for casino gambling and the absence of estimates of elasticities of 6 Studies on win percentage of pari-mutuel horse betting include Gruen (1976) , Suits (1979) , and Pescatrice (1980) . Studies on win percentage of lotteries include DeBoer (1986), Gulley and Scott (1993) , Farrell and Walker (1999) , Farrell et al. (2000) , Forrest, Gulley, and Simmons (2000) , Beenstock and Haitovsky (2001) , Yu (2008) , and Combs and Spry (2012) .
the casino tax base with respect to casino tax rates. 7 Only two studies (Thalheimer and Ali, 2003; Landers, 2008) In contrast, an extremely robust literature has developed over the years analyzing the impact of price changes and tax rate changes on the demand for commodities subject to general sales taxes and special excise taxes like alcohol and tobacco excises. Fujii (1980) , Bishop and Yoo (1985) , Baltagi and Levin (1986) , and Gallet (2007) , for instance, estimate the price elasticity of demand for various commodities. More importantly, Friedlaender, Swanson, and Due (1973) , Walsh and Jones (1988) , Coats (1995) , Deskins (2007) , Bruce, Deskins and Fox (2008) , and Tosun and Skidmore (2012) estimate the tax rate elasticity for the sales tax base and for select excise tax bases. As well, Barzell (1976) , Walsh and Jones (1988) , Keeler, et al. (1996) , Poterba (1996) , Besley and Rosen (1999) , Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2002) , and Tosun and Skidmore (2012) estimate the rate at which tax increases are shifted forward to consumers via higher after-tax prices. 8 Comps are complimentary items and services, such as free gambling chips, drinks, and bus rides, which are given out by casinos to encourage players to gamble.
compensating more fully for the tax increases with increases in the win percentage. This response by Illinois casinos fits with the analysis by Metters, et al. (2008) , which illuminates the different components of the casino gambling product and the pricing relating to this product. The overall casino gambling product is comprised of the gambling games plus the various services and amenities offered concurrently by the casino (i.e. bars, restaurants, hotels, spas, other entertainment, and promotional programs that provide free or reduced price access to these amenities). In Illinois, the preponderance of the wagering handle decline potentially was attributable to the operational changes employed by the casinos and not to the changes in the win percentage.
Barzell (1976) examines tax shifting relating to cigarette taxes that is much like the shifting of the casino tax increases that went on in Illinois. He explained the over-shifting of excise taxes into consumer prices as a function of product improvements that may occur in response to the tax increase. He posited that an increase in a per-pack cigarette tax may encourage producers to increase the length of cigarettes. Thus, the price of a pack of cigarettes is increased by more than the tax increase. The price increase is predicated not only on the tax increase but also on the cost of the quality improvement in the cigarettes. Presumably, an alternative strategy could be simply to increase the price to offset part of the tax and then reduce the length of the cigarettes to cut the producer's cost. The price increase and operational cost reduction could offset the additional cost of the tax increase. This appears to have been the strategy of the casinos in Illinois. The win percentage pays for more than just the ability to play the casino's games. It also pays for the package of services, amenities, and promotional programs. Thus, when wagering taxes are increased, the casino can essentially shift the tax forward via a higher win percentage or exact a more implicit price on gamblers by reducing the quality of services, amenities, comps, and other promotional programs to cut production costs. In the end, the behavioral response by the Illinois casinos isn't exactly what we would expect of a seller faced with an increase in a sales or excise tax. Therefore, while the price elasticity estimates of Thalheimer and Ali (2003) and Landers (2008) are informative in providing accurate estimates of the response of the casino tax base due to casino tax increases, we need estimates of the tax rate elasticity of AGR.
In summary, previous studies are insufficient in addressing the impact on state budgets from changes in direct casino tax rates. Therefore, this paper's estimation of the tax rate elasticity of AGR (and admissions) provides a more accurate picture for policy makers about the impact of a change in a state's casino tax rates on its casino tax base. In addition, this paper starts to fill a significant gap in the literature on casino taxation, and adds to the broader literature on state and local tax base elasticities. 
III. MIDWESTERN RIVERBOAT GAMBLING

Riverboat gambling began in
IV. DATA
The data for variables directly involved with Illinois casino gambling were obtained from the Illinois Gaming Board. Specifically, monthly adjusted gross receipts data and monthly admissions data for each Illinois casino, monthly state-wide data on numbers of slot machines and table games, and gambling regulatory histories were obtained from the Illinois Gaming Board website.
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We chose a sample period for our analysis that ranges from January 1997 through Illinois has imposed three direct taxes on casinos, beginning with a traditional wagering tax on AGR and an admissions tax. Tables 3 and 4 trace the history of casino taxation in Illinois.
Initially, the traditional wagering tax began as a fixed 20 percent of AGR, and was coupled with a tax of $2 per admission. Then in 1998, the Illinois legislature passed a bill which was signed by the governor, to implement a graduated AGR tax schedule with rates ranging from 15 to 35 We take into account the admissions tax rates, as well as the statutory AGR tax rates and the horse racing surcharge on AGR, in constructing the marginal casino tax variable for Illinois.
Because Illinois tends to change the wagering tax rates at the same time as the admissions tax rates, it would be incorrect to infer that variation in AGR from tax rate changes is attributable solely to variation in wagering tax. Even though admissions tax revenue is a smaller percentage of casino tax revenue than wagering tax revenue (around 8 percent), 14 an admissions tax change alone could impact behavior at the margin. For example, it could reduce marketing efforts aimed at seeking marginally profitable gamblers.
To compute the marginal casino tax rate variable for Illinois, we apply a weighted average method to marginal wagering and admissions taxes levied on each of the nine Illinois casinos. Applying the tax rate schedules in Table 3 to the individual casino AGR levels illustrated in Table 5 reveals a wide range of effective tax rates across casinos. Likewise, there is wide variation in admissions and admissions tax rates across casinos. In our computation process, we first impute the marginal admissions tax facing each casino each month as a percent of the casino's AGR by multiplying admissions by the marginal tax per admission and dividing 13 Upon signing the bill that authorized the 3 percent surcharge on casinos in 2006, Governor Blagojevich said, "These bills will help protect the jobs of thousands of hardworking people who depend on the horse racing industry for their livelihood. They will also create a more level playing field that will allow the horse racing industry to remain competitive in through June 2007 (as described at the end of Table 3 ) did not affect casino decision making at the margin, and so we do not incorporate this provision into the computation of the casino tax rate.
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[ Table 5 about here]
The resulting casino tax rate monthly series is displayed in Figure 5 . This tax rate starts [ Figure 5 and Table 6 about here] 15 Under the hold harmless provision, each casino was liable for the maximum of the computed wagering tax (according to the new graduated schedule of 2005) or a flat, guarantee amount for its preceding fiscal year. Guarantee amounts were set based on the casino's previous AGR history, and are listed at the end of Table 3 . All but two casinos ended up being subject to the guarantee amounts from July 2005 through June 2006, and all but three from July 2006 through June 2007. Theoretically, it is hard to determine if the wagering tax would be viewed as a zero percent marginal rate by a casino for which the guarantee amount is binding. A casino's perceived marginal tax rate in would depend in part its projections of AGR, which would be highly dependent on macroeconomic effects. For these reasons, we do not take into account the "hold harmless" provision in this study, although it may be appropriate to explore the provision in a study of individual casinos.
V. ECONOMETRIC MODEL
The model for statewide AGR and for statewide admissions is specified as
where y t is Illinois' monthly AGR or monthly admissions. We assume an AR (1) One disadvantage of highly graduated income tax schedules is that they create a disincentive for those individuals facing the highest rates to earn income that would expand the size of the tax base. Similarly, a state imposing high tax rates on its casinos creates a disincentive for them to make capital investments. In Illinois, the number of positions is capped, but not other capital investments. With a marginal tax rate of 70 percent on adjusted gross revenue, if a casino's entertainment portfolio (hotels, spas, restaurants, entertainment, golf courses, etc.) is expanded to bring in $1,000 additional adjusted gross receipts, the casino keeps less than $300 of that increase because all the additional expenses have to be paid out of the $300.
appear to be disconnected from month-to-month changes in the growth path of casino tax revenues. As described above, statutory shifts in the tax schedule occur at discrete intervals that are timed with respect to various political factors like the biennial budget cycle and often influenced by shortfalls in other revenue sources rather than shortfalls in casino tax revenue. 
VI. RESULTS
We estimate Models 1 through 3 for AGR and Models 1 through 3 for Admissions. In Beginning with the AGR estimates as shown in Table 7 , we find that AGR is inelastic with respect to the casino tax rate. The coefficients of the log of the tax rate variable range from -0.220 to -0.235 and are highly statistically significant. That is, a one percent increase in the casino tax rate causes an estimated decrease in AGR of approximately two tenths of one percent. 18 The increase in unit tax revenue is not offset fully by a reduction in tax revenues; therefore, a casino tax rate increase results in higher casino tax revenue.
[ Table 7 about here]
In addition, the regulatory changes have large, highly statistically significant influences on AGR. The smoking ban variable coefficient estimates range from -0.191 to -0.194 . That is, the smoking ban is responsible for between a 17 to 18 percent decrease in AGR. 19 Our estimate compares to a somewhat larger estimate of a 22 percent decrease in AGR found by Garrett and Pakko (2009 Most of the growth and seasonal control variables are statistically significant. The quadratic trend term estimates show that AGR increases with time but at a diminishing rate, all else constant. However, neither of the position variable coefficient estimates is statistically significant. It is possible that much of the growth of industry capacity may already be captured by the quadratic trend. AGR is pro-cyclical according to the estimated positive coefficient of the economic activity index. Finally, the monthly dummy coefficients display a great deal of seasonal variation, although the estimates of these coefficients are not reported here.
Turning to the determinants of admissions, the tax elasticity and other estimates for the admissions models are shown in Table 8 . Similar to the AGR results, the elasticity of admissions with respect to the casino tax rate is highly statistically significant and is estimated to be between -0.226 and -0.234. That is, a one percent increase in the casino tax rate leads to a decrease of about two-tenths of one percent in the monthly admissions count.
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[ Table 8 about here]
Casino regulatory policy has a somewhat mixed effect on admissions. The coefficient of the continuous boarding variable is positive and highly statistically significant, ranging from 0.301 to 0.305. That is, there is a remarkable increase in the monthly admissions counts of 35 to 36 percent that is attributable to the shift to continuous boarding. However, unlike Garrett and Pakko (2009) , and in contrast with the AGR results, our estimated coefficient of the smoking ban for admissions is not a statistically significant determinant of admissions. 22 Perhaps the discrepancy is attributable to some specification differences between the models. In addition, the admissions series is extremely variable. Admissions data is also subject to an interesting form of measurement error. 23 In the end, even if the smoking ban doesn't impact admissions, our results suggest that it may decrease smokers' rates of gambling, as they now need to take breaks to smoke outside the casino rather than smoke while they gamble on the gaming floor.
The growth path variables do not have a strong effect on admissions, although the monthly dummy coefficient estimates show significant seasonality. In all three admissions models, the trend variable is not statistically significant, although the trend squared estimates are statistically significant but small and negative. Therefore the quadratic trend accounts for a 21 Garrett and Pakko (2009) find that their tax dummy variable (corresponding to the forty percent increase in the top marginal wagering tax rate from July 2003 to June 2005) has an estimated 18 percent negative impact on monthly admissions. 22 Garrett and Pakko (2009) find that continuous boarding has a slightly lower estimated impact of 31.2 percent increase in admissions. However, they estimate a 12.3 percent decrease in admissions due to the smoking ban. Nevertheless, their estimates do concur with our finding that, in general, the smoking ban impacts casino AGR much more than the number of admissions. 23 According to a government report, "some gaming experts have indicated that when admission taxes were raised in FY 2004, some casinos relocated their admission turnstiles to make sure they were only counting those patrons who were entering the casino to gamble...and to better keep under-age visitors from entering. 
A. Robustness Checks
Because the variables in this study are levels, not differences, some of the right hand side variables are correlated with one another. In particular we were concerned about the high correlations of the log of the tax variable with the trend variable, and of the economic activity index with the trend variable. To see whether these correlations impacted our results, we ran alternative regression models for AGR, none of which proved to be superior to our original specifications in Table 7 .
We estimated several alternative models. First we performed a single-variable regression of the log of AGR against the log of the tax variable. This regression produced a positive tax elasticity, which indicates the necessity of controlling for other factors. Next, we ran the full scale version of Model 3, omitting each of the following right hand side variables, one at a time:
trend, square of trend, log of tax variable, log of positions, economic activity index, Smokefree, continuous boarding, and the monthly dummy variables. We compared our results from each of the variable elimination experiments to the results in Table 7 . Eliminating the economic activity index had little effect on the tax elasticity but produced a negative coefficient of the log of positions. Eliminating the trend variable (and in separate regressions, trend squared and the Smokefree variable) reduced the statistical significance of the estimated tax elasticity to well below 90 percent, and substantially reduced its magnitude. Eliminating continuous boarding had little effect on the estimated coefficients of the remaining variables, with the exception of the log of positions, which became statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Similarly, eliminating the monthly dummy variables had little effect on the estimated coefficients, but slightly reduced the R-squared statistic.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper contributes to the literature on gambling by providing the first estimate, to our Notes: Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses. Dummy variables to correct for seasonal monthly effects were included for eleven months, but coefficients are not reported here. Notes: Asterisks denote significance and the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses. Dummy variables to correct for seasonal monthly effects were included for eleven months, but coefficients are not reported here. 
